Introduction
Pricing anomalies are controversial. The case for pricing anomalies as an artifact of market inefficiency rather than risk would be strengthened if components of abnormal returns predictable from publicly available information were found to be highly associated with predictable components of analysts' earnings forecast errors. This is because price changes related to earnings surprises are likely to be only marginally affected by uncontrolled risk Sloan [2001, 2006] ).
Unresolved issues regarding analysts' earnings forecasts include whether the predictable component to analysts' forecast errors documented by the prior literature is robust under alternative loss function assumptions, 1 and, if it is the case, then whether the predictable components of forecast errors are exploitable in the sense of profitable trading strategies.
Resolving these issues would also speak to whether analysts' forecasts are a good proxy for the unobservable market earnings expectations.
In this study, we investigate the association between the predictable component of abnormal stock returns and the predictable component of analysts' forecast errors in two stages: First, we estimate predictable components by regressing future abnormal returns, and, alternatively, future forecast errors, on a comprehensive set of publicly observable variables shown in earlier studies to be related to over and under reactions by the market or analysts. Second, we regress future abnormal returns (future forecast errors) on the predictable component of forecast errors (abnormal returns). 2 The first stage regressions serve to confirm the potential market and analyst inefficiencies; albeit for a broader 1 Recent research by Gu and Wu (2003) and Basu and Markov (2005) conclude that analyst forecast inefficiency is greatly reduced if one assumes that analyst minimizes the mean absolute error in forecasting, thus casting doubt on the analyst inefficiency literature. 2 We also employ a portfolio approach having partitioned distributions of first stage estimates.
public information set than sets employed in previous studies. The principal innovation resides in the second-stage regressions.
If analysts' forecasts corresponded precisely to market expectations, then the predictable component of abnormal returns and the predictable component of analysts'
forecast errors would be perfectly aligned, implying that pricing anomalies are a consequence of distorted expectations of earnings rather than insufficient control for risk in measuring abnormal returns. The reality is that the predictable component of abnormal To explain this asymmetry econometrically, it is useful to divide the predictable components in analyst earnings forecast errors and abnormal stock returns into three elements: an element common to both, and two independent elements. The asymmetry occurs if the common element of the predictable components is large (small) relative to the independent element of the predictable component of abnormal returns (forecast errors).
their own funds at stake, they may face conflicts of interest due to investment banking connections, and they may seek to appease management; i.e., all factors that may lead to analyst inefficiencies not shared by the market and for which there is a measure of support from previous empirical studies (e.g., Francis and Philbrick [1993] , Alford and Berger [1997] ). Of course, the market may also be susceptible to factors leading to distortions in expectations not shared by analysts such as psychological biases of noise traders and limits of arbitrage (Shleifer [1997] ). Our results on second-stage significance tests suggest that the former sources of inefficiencies specific to analysts' forecasts collectively swamp the common element of the predictable components, but not so with the latter sources of inefficiencies specific to market expectations.
Several novel implications follow from our findings: First, the direction of analyst earnings forecast errors is consistent with the direction of predictable abnormal returns, suggesting that market inefficiency is at work when we find abnormal returns are predictable using public information. Second, the predictability of analysts' forecast errors does not directly translate into profitable trading strategies; rather the predictable component of analysts' forecast errors is largely unrelated to future abnormal returns.
These two implications combined suggest that while analysts' forecasts can be used to test whether the predictable returns are due to risk or inefficiency, inefficiencies in those forecasts need not be directly exploitable in generating trading gains. Third, the fact that a large fraction of the predictable analyst forecast errors is not shared by the market suggests that analyst forecasts considerably differ from market earnings expectations.
This calls into question the frequent use of analysts' earnings forecasts as proxies for the market expectations for inferring firm's cost of capital in studies that attempt to link cost of capital with firm characteristics (e.g., Botosan [1997] ). If the market and analysts react to information in firm characteristics at differential degrees of efficiency, by using analyst earnings forecasts as proxies for market expectations, the implied cost of capital will likely pick up the difference and result in spurious correlation between the implied cost of capital and the firm characteristics under investigation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we analytically examine the relation between the predictable components of analyst forecast errors and market returns; in Section 3, we discuss how the expressions derived in Section 2 can be implemented empirically; in Section 4, we describe the sample; in Section 5, we report the empirical results; and finally, in Section 6, we conclude.
Econometric analysis

First-Stage
We begin our inquiry by formalizing the analysis underlying our empirical specification for deriving first-stage estimates of the predictable components of analysts' forecast errors and market price changes holding risk considerations aside. Consider a one-period setting in which at the start of the period both analysts and the market form expectations of earnings, e , to be reported at the end of the period, based on all available public information, I . Unbiased estimates that fully employ I are denoted e * . That is e e ε * = +
where ε represents the earnings surprise; ( | ) 0. 
where η represents a common error and ,
represent independent errors by analysts and the market, respectively. We further assume that errors in analysts' forecasts and market expectations are made with respect to a subset of publicly available information, X I ⊂ , in a linear fashion:
Taking the expectation of analysts' forecast errors conditional on X , we arrive at the following expression for the predictable component of analysts' forecast errors:
E e e X X λ λ β β
By the law of iterated expectations, a necessary condition for analyst or market efficiency is that 0 a X λ − = . In principle, a λ captures the combined effects of common and independent components of forecast errors and may be estimated by regressing forecast errors on the vector of publicly available information variables:
e e a a X ε
where ( )
Since the market expectations are not observable we will appeal to price, p , as a reflection of those expectations. In keeping with prior research, we assume that price is a multiple, k , of the market's expectation (e.g., Liu, Nissim and Thomas [2002] ):
The price changes with the realization of earnings, implying that
or equivalently, ( ) m p k e e ∆ = − . The predictable component of the error in market expectations can, therefore, be written as
and m kλ can be estimated from a regression of future price changes on the vector of publicly available information variables:
Second-stage analysis
We now consider the second-stage estimation. Given ; , 
where ( ) 
This is because the true relation is of the form forecasts may not be a good approximation of market expectations.
Implementation
In order to complete empirical specifications of the first and second-stage regressions as given by equations (5), (9), (12), and (13), we add dividends to price changes, control for heteroscedasticity by the common practice of deflating by price at the beginning of the period, and adjust for risk by using CRSP size-adjusted abnormal returns.
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Similar to Ou and Penman [1989] and Lev and Thiagarajan [1993] , we take a comprehensive approach in determining publicly available information likely to be 5 The alternatives based on factors to remove systematic risk are either ineffective in the data (the CAPM or the Consumption CAPM) or under dispute (see Daniel and Titman [1997] on Fama and French's [1993] three factor model). To the extent that size is an inadequate control for risk, it will bias against our result that market understands a large fraction of the inefficiencies in analysts' earnings forecasts. In other words, our asymmetry finding might be more pronounced if we used a more complete risk model. associated with predictability in analysts' forecast errors and abnormal returns. The variables considered include both under-reaction and over-reaction variables identified in earlier studies. The former include quarterly earnings announcements (Mendenhall [1991] , Bernard and Thomas [1989] ), past price changes (Abarbanell [1991] , Gleason and Lee [2003] , Jagadesh and Titman [1993] ) and past earnings forecast revisions (Gleason and Lee [2003] and Stickel [1991] ). The latter include book-to-price ratio, forward earnings-to-price ratio, past sales growth, and analysts' long-term forecasts considered by Frankel and Lee [1998] . Past sales growth is based on La Porta's [1996] findings that the market tends to extrapolate past sales growth and that such growth is negatively associated with future returns. Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan [2000] found that analysts tend to be overly optimistic in their long-term growth forecasts and that these forecast levels are negatively associated with future returns. 6 We also employ the accrual component of earnings a la Sloan [1997] based on his findings of over-reactions to accruals compared to cash flows and, when deflated by assets, their negative correlation with future returns. Last, we include variables capturing a negative association between capital expenditures and future abnormal returns based on findings of Titman, Wei, and Xie [2001] .
For the first-stage regressions, we estimate predictable components of analysts' forecast errors and abnormal returns, both with a one-year horizon, in-sample and out-ofsample. To accomplish the latter, we use data from the past five years to predict analysts' forecast errors and abnormal returns at one month after the release of annual earnings.
For the in-sample regressions, we consider variations of the model including limiting the set of variables representing publicly available information for parsimony. As a check on 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics
We obtain earnings forecasts and actual earnings from I/B/E/S. All per share data in I/B/E/S are adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends using the I/B/E/S adjustment factors. We obtain stock price and return data from CRSP monthly tape, and financial statement data from the industrial, full coverage, and research tapes of COMPUSTAT.
We include in our sample every observation for which we can calculate the variables 7 We implement the LAD procedure by using the LAV routine in SAS/IML. This routine relies on algorithms in Masden and Nielsen [1993] Fret: Size-adjusted future abnormal stock returns, accumulated in the 13 months after the measurement of Error.
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MV: Market value, price per share times the number of shares outstanding from CRSP, measured at the same time as Error.
Cover: Analyst coverage, defined as the number of all analysts who issued earnings forecasts for the firm for the upcoming year.
Acc: Accounting accruals in the most recent annual earnings, measured as the change in non-cash current assets minus depreciation and the change in current liabilities, excluding the current portion of long-term debts and tax 9 Return window of thirteen months is chosen to capture the realization of earnings in the next fiscal year. The results are essentially the same when we use a twelve-month window for returns.
payables. We standardized by the average total assets in the past two years.
B/P: Book-to-market ratio, which is book value per share from the most recent balance sheet over the stock price from CRSP, the stock price is measure at the same time as Error. E/P: Forward Earnings/price ratio, i.e., analysts' earnings forecast for the twoyear-ahead annual earnings over stock price from I/B/E/S, both measured at the same time as Error.
Ltg: Analyst long-term EPS growth rate forecast, measured at the same time as
Error.
Ltsg: Annualized long-term sales growth rate in the past five years.
∆PPE:
Change of Property, Plant and Equipment from the previous year, standardized by the average total asset in the last two years.
∆OLA:
Change of other long-term assets from the previous year, standardized by the average total asset in the last two years.
UE:
The earnings surprise for the most recent fiscal quarter, standardized by stock price from I/B/E/S.
Ret: Raw stock return in the past 12 months before the measurement of Error.
Rev: Revision of the consensus analysts' forecast during the 3 months before the measurement of Error, standardized by stock price from I/B/E/S.
(Insert Table 1 Consistent with Sloan [1996] and Bradshaw et al. [2001] , accounting accruals on average are income reducing, with a mean (median) of -3.5% (-3.9%) of total assets. The mean and median of B/P ratios are in the neighborhood of 0.5. The average forward E/P ratio of our sample is 0.08, suggesting an average P/E ratio of 12.5. This divergence from average trailing earnings based P/E ratio is expected because the two-year-out earnings forecasts build in expected earnings growth for the next two years (Claus and Thomas [2001] This implies that the information contents in these variables are largely orthogonal, hence, forecasting may be improved by combining these variables in a single model.
Results
First Stage Analysis
In this subsection, we present first-stage in-sample coefficient estimates from pooled regressions analogous to equation (5) for predicting analysts' forecast errors from various public information variables to compare with previous studies, statistics on the reduction in forecast errors from removing the out-of-sample estimated predictable components, characteristics of firms for which there is the greatest improvement in precision from such removal, and robustness checks on the surprisingly large magnitude of predictable component estimates. We also present both in-sample and out-of-sample estimated predictable components of abnormal returns from regressions analogous to equation (9). Table 2 presents the in-sample pooled regression results estimated using the LAD procedure. We separate the prediction variables into three groups: accounting accruals (Acc), over-reaction variables (B/P, E/P, Ltg, Ltsg, ∆PPE, ∆OLA), and under-reaction variables (UE, Ret, Rev) . Acc is separated from other over-reaction variables because prior literature analyzed accruals in isolation (e.g., Sloan [1996] and Bradshaw et al [2001] ). Because a R 2 type goodness-of-fit measure is not available for the LAD procedure, we only report the coefficient estimates and associated t-values.
Forecasting analyst forecast errors
(Insert Table 2 Table 2 suggests that analyst inefficiency is a robust phenomenon even under LAD. This is in contrast with a recent paper by Basu and Markov [2004] who show that LAD mitigates the inefficiency finding demonstrated in the prior literature under OLS. In analysis available but not reported here, we show that the differences arise because we examine a larger set of prediction variables, and we measure both earnings forecasts and forecast errors at one-year horizon in Table 2 . In Basu and Markov [2004] , annual earnings expectations are measured at one month before annual earnings announcements, effectively making their annual earnings surprises equivalent to the earnings surprises of the last fiscal quarter since the first three quarters of earnings are already known at the measurement date.
The in-sample results reported in Table 2 (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) data are used for model estimation. Our results are presented in Table 3 .
(Insert Table 3 
Sources of improvement
In this subsection we investigate the sources of improvement documented in Table 3 . Motivated by the results of Easterwood and Nutt [1999] , who document asymmetric inefficiency in analyst forecasts, we sort stocks into decile portfolios based on the (ex ante) predicted value of forecasted errors, and examine whether the forecast improvement happens asymmetrically across portfolios. Results are reported in Panel A of Table 4 . From Portfolio 1 to Portfolio 10, the predicted earnings forecast errors go from the most negative to the most positive. For each portfolio, we report the mean and median of actual forecast errors, the mean and median of forecast errors based on adjusted forecasts, the amount of improvement in MAD after the adjustment, and the frequency at which the adjusted forecasts are more accurate than the unadjusted forecasts.
(Insert Table 4 about here)
It is clear that the out-of-sample predictions are generally in the correct directions as implied by the monotonicity of actual means and medians from Portfolio 1 to 10. It is also clear that our model offers only a partial adjustment because the monotonicity is preserved for the adjusted means and medians. For seven out of the ten portfolios, the adjusted forecasts are more precise than the original forecasts. What is striking is that most of the improvement happens in portfolios where analyst forecasts are predicted to be too optimistic. In portfolios where our model predicts pessimism on the part of analysts, the adjustments in fact make the forecasts less precise. Consistent with Easterwood and Nutt [1999] , our results imply that analysts are efficient in impounding good news in their forecasts, but are inefficient in impounding bad news.
In Panel B, we examine the characteristics of firms in each portfolio to see how the portfolios that offer improvement differ from other portfolios. As expected, we find that the improved portfolios are in general those that receive the least attention in the stock market: they are smaller in size and more thinly covered by analysts. Inspecting the values of the prediction variables, we find variables such as B/P ratio, E/P ratio, ∆PPE, UE, Ret, and Rev are monotonic across the portfolios, suggesting that overall these variables are the primary drivers for the portfolio separation. Of course, in any particular year, the weights that are assigned to these variables for prediction can vary.
Robustness issues
The large inefficiency we document about analysts' forecasts may seem surprising to some. In order to ensure that our results are robust, we conduct several additional tests.
First, there might be concern that our results are due to the particular measure of analysts' forecasts we adopt. We address this issue in two ways. First, we replace median consensus forecasts with mean consensus forecasts and find the results are essentially the same. Second, we address the issue that the consensus may contain stale forecasts by replacing the consensus forecasts with the latest individual forecasts issued within one month after earnings announcements and repeating the analysis. The results are qualitatively similar though smaller in magnitude.
Second, since most of the improvement in forecast accuracy comes from forecasts that are predicted to be too optimistic, a question naturally arises whether an intercept adjustment by itself is driving the whole result. We find this is not the case. If we only adjust for analysts' global optimism with an intercept, the improvement in analysts' forecast accuracy, measured by either MSE and MAD, is negligible.
Third, a concern about out-of-sample prediction test is that there is no theory that can guide us on how to most efficiently use past data for estimation. On one hand, one could argue that one should use all available data because more data generates more efficient estimates. On the other hand, to the extent that there could be regime shifts during the sampling period, using more recent data may generate coefficients more fitting to the current regime. Our choice of using five year rolling regressions is a compromise between these two concerns. To address the former concern, we also extend the data to ten years and all available data. The results are essentially the same.
Predicting size-adjusted abnormal returns
Having established that analyst forecast errors are predictable out of sample, we now turn our attention to the prediction of future size-adjusted abnormal returns. Panel A of Table 5 presents the pooled coefficient estimates of our prediction model, where the prediction variables are the same as in prior tables and the dependent variable is now future size-adjusted abnormal returns measured over 13 months starting one month after the release of earnings for the last fiscal year. 13 Consistent with prior research, all overreaction (under-reaction) variables have negative (positive) signs. All coefficients except those for B/P, Ltsg, and Rev are statistically significant.
(Insert Table 5 about here.)
To predict abnormal returns out of sample, in each year, we follow the same procedure as in prior tables and conduct rolling LAD regressions using the preceding five years of data to estimate the model parameters, and then form predictions of next thirteen month's abnormal returns using the most recent realizations of the prediction variables.
We then divide the sample into five quintile portfolios based on the predicted abnormal returns. Panel B tabulates the realized equally-weighted size-adjusted abnormal returns for each portfolio as well as a hedge return that is long in Portfolio (quintile) 5 and short in Portfolio 1. The results are consistent with the notion that the stock market does not impound public information efficiently. As shown in the last row of Panel B, we observe 13 We choose a thirteen month window to ensure that the return period covers the announcement of next annual earnings.
that the mean abnormal returns increase monotonically from Portfolio 1 to Portfolio 5. In addition, in ten out of twelve years examined, we observe positive returns for the hedge portfolio, with a global mean of 9% for the thirteen-month period.
Given that the same set of prediction variables can be used to forecast analyst earnings forecast errors and future abnormal returns out of sample, one can easily conjecture that the two results might be related. We note, however, it is an empirical question whether a positive relation between the two exists because the regression loadings on the prediction variables can differ substantially. For example, while both book-to-price ratio and analyst earnings forecast revisions are statistically significant in predicting analyst forecast errors, they are insignificant in the prediction of future abnormal returns, suggesting different mechanisms are at work for the observed predictability in returns and earnings forecast errors.
Second Stage Analysis
In this subsection, we present the results of the second-stage regressions of future analysts' forecast errors on first-stage estimates of predictable components of abnormal returns (equation 12) and future abnormal returns on first-stage estimates of predictable components of forecast errors (equation 14). We also report results based on quintile portfolio averages that allow us to assess the profitability of trading strategies based on predictability of forecast errors.
(Insert Table 6 about here)
The relation between the predictable forecast errors and predictable abnormal returns
In each panel of Table 6 , we report both portfolio results and regression results.
Panel A is designed to assess whether analysts make the same mistakes as the market. In the portfolio analysis, we first form quintile portfolios based on the predicted abnormal returns, and then calculate the mean forecast errors for each portfolio based on one-yearout and two-year-out earnings forecasts. The results indicate that forecasts errors are positively correlated with portfolio ranks for both one-year-out and two-year-out forecasts. For the hedge portfolio that is long in Portfolio 5 and short in Portfolio 1, the differences in forecast errors are 2.7% of the stock price for one-year-out forecasts (tvalue 3.792) and 3.8% of stock price for two-year-out forecasts (t-value 5.02). In the regression analysis, we regress the future forecast errors on the rank percentile of the predicted future abnormal returns and find highly consistent results. The coefficients are 0.031 (t-value 10.83) and 0.043 (t-value 13.076) for analyst forecast errors based on oneyear and two-year-out forecasts, respectively.
These results suggest that analysts make errors in common with the market and the independent component of market inefficiency is not large enough to mask the detection of analyst inefficiency on the basis of predictable abnormal returns. This result is consistent with prior findings by Abarbanell and Bernard [1992] and Bradshaw et al [2001] .
In Panel B, we reverse the analysis and sort firms into quintile portfolios based on These results suggest that the independent element in the predictable component of analyst forecast errors is large relative to the common element, and since this independent element has little to do with the predictable component of market returns, it becomes a source of noise that biases the test toward the null. To further examine this conclusion, we now turn to an earnings-return association test, which provides evidence from a different angle to the issues at hand.
14 We note that the average size adjusted abnormal returns are positive in our sample. This is due to the fact that our sample firms are larger than the average firm in the CRSP universe, and in the sample period between 1989 and 2000, larger firms performed better than smaller firms.
Association Test
In the contemporaneous regressions of market returns on earnings surprises, analyst earnings forecast is a noisy proxy for the market's earnings expectation due to the presence of an independent element in the predictable component of analyst earnings forecast errors. If untreated, this measurement noise will bias the regression coefficients toward zero and generate a smaller R 2 value. To alleviate problem, ideally we should remove the independent element from the RHS. To the extent that this element cannot be easily isolated, we can instead partially address the issue by removing the entire predictable component in analyst forecast errors, including both the independent and the common elements. If, as suggested by the prediction test, the independent element is relatively large with respect to the common element, the signal to noise ratio is likely to be favorable, and as a result both the ERC and R 2 should increase.
The evidence in Table 7 is consistent with this conjecture. In Panel A, we report the year-by-year OLS cross-sectional regressions of annual size-adjusted returns on annual earnings surprises, and contrast those with regressions where the earning expectations are adjusted by our prediction model, following the same procedure as in Table 3 . While for unadjusted earnings forecasts, the mean ERC for 12 annual regressions is 1.774 and the mean R 2 value is 0.079; the estimates for the model adjusted regressions are higher, with mean coefficient value of 2.133 and mean R 2 value of 0.091.
In Panel B, we test the statistical significance between the two sets of estimates by following Fama and McBeth (1973) and treat each annual estimate as an independent draw. While both ERC and R 2 are higher for the adjusted regression, the difference in ERC is more significant statistically.
(Insert Table 7 about here)
Reversing the order of analysis, in Table 8 , we conduct reverse earnings-return regressions where annual earnings surprise is the dependent variable and the contemporaneous abnormal return is the independent variable. In this case, the same measurement error problem will arise if the independent element for the predictable component of abnormal market returns is substantial, a condition not likely to hold as suggested by our prediction test. If we nonetheless repeat the same procedure and remove the entire predictable component of abnormal returns from the RHS, the resulting regression coefficient and R 2 value may even decrease because the common element is removed from the RHS but not from the LHS, creating a new source of noise. We find this is indeed the case: while for the unadjusted regressions the mean coefficient is 0.035 and the mean R 2 value is 0.083, they decrease to 0.032 and 0.072 for the adjusted regressions. A Fama-McBeth type statistical analysis suggests that the differences in both the coefficient estimate and R 2 values are highly significant (Panel B). This asymmetry in result mirrors that in the prediction test, and is consistent with the notion that beyond a common element of inefficiency, analysts exhibit additional inefficiency absent in market pricing.
(Insert Table 8 about here)
Conclusions
In this study, we first establish the existence of predictable components to both analysts' forecast errors and abnormal returns employing the same comprehensive set of publicly available information variables and the robust Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) estimation procedure. Next, we examine the associations between the predictable components of those forecast errors and abnormal returns. Our two-stage approach allows us to distinguish the relative levels of analyst and market inefficiencies. In particular, we find that the independent element of the predictable component of analysts forecast errors appears to be important relative to the element in common with predictability in abnormal returns.
This asymmetry suggests that, while the market appears to comprehend predictability in analysts' forecast errors, analysts do not appear to comprehend predictability in abnormal returns. Hence, one might contend that the market is more efficient. These results further suggest that while analysts' forecasts can be used to examine whether the predictable market returns are due to risk or inefficiency, the inefficiency in those forecasts needs not be directly exploitable in generating trading profits. Last, the presence of a sizeable predictable component of analysts' forecast errors for which the independent element dominates suggests that analysts' forecasts may be a poor proxy for market expectations under some conditions. As a consequence, the popular approach in the literature using analysts' forecasts of future earnings and growth to infer implied cost of capital may produce cost of capital estimates tainted by the independent inefficiency in analyst forecasts.
TABLE 1 Descriptive Characteristics of Sample Variables
The sample contains 15,409 firm-year observations between 1984 and 2003, representing all firms in I/B/E/S consensus tape with available data in CRSP and COMPUSTAT. Error is consensus (median) analyst forecast error for the upcoming annual earnings, measured one month after the most recent annual earnings announcement. Fret is size-adjusted future abnormal stock return, accumulated in the 13 months after the measurement of Error. MV is market value. Cover is analyst coverage, defined as the number of all analysts who issued earnings forecasts for the upcoming year. Acc is the amount of accounting accruals in the most recent annual earnings, measured as the change in non-cash current assets minus depreciation and the change in current liabilities, excluding the current portion of long-term debts and tax payables. B/P is book-to-market, which is book value per share from the most recent balance sheet over the stock price. E/P is analysts' earnings forecast for the two-year-ahead annual earnings over stock price. Ltg is analyst long-term EPS growth rate forecast. Ltsg is the annualized long-term sales growth rate in the past five years. ∆PPE and ∆OLA are the changes of property, plant and equipment and other long-term assets from the previous year. UE is the earnings surprise for the most recent quarter. Ret is raw stock return in the past 12 months before the measurement of Error. Rev is revision of the consensus analysts' forecast during the 3 months before the measurement of Error. Error, UE and Rev are standardized by current stock price, while Acc, ∆PPE and ∆OLA are standardized by average total assets in the nearest two years. MV, Ltg and stock price are measured at the same time as Error. 
Panel A: Distributional Statistics
TABLE 2 In-sample Pooled LAD Regressions of Analyst Forecast Errors on Prediction Variables
The dependent variable is consensus (median) analyst forecast error for the upcoming annual earnings deflated by the stock price on the forecast date. The independent variables are: accounting accruals (Acc), book to price ratio (B/P), forward earnings to price ratio (E/P), analysts' long term EPS growth rate forecast (Ltg), annualized sales growth rate in the past 5 years (Ltsg), changes of property, plant and equipment and other long-term assets in the previous year (∆PPE and ∆OLA), earnings surprise for the most recent quarter (UE), stock return for the past 12 months (Ret) and revision of analysts' two-year-out forecasts in the past 3 months (Rev). Detailed definitions of variables are in Section 3. T-statistics are reported underneath coefficient estimates. 
Intercept
TABLE 4 The Sources of Improvement
Panel A reports the distribution of forecast errors of decile portfolios sorted by the predicted forecast errors. Improvement is calculated as (MAD of adjusted forecast/MAD of actual forecast -1) *100. % Improved is the frequency with which LAD adjusted forecasts are more accurate than actual forecasts. Panel B reports portfolio characteristics of the decile portfolios. The independent variables are: market capitalization (MV), analyst coverage (Cover), accounting accruals (Acc), book to price ratio (B/P), forward earnings to price ratio (E/P), analysts' long term EPS growth rate forecast (Ltg), annualized sales growth rate in the past 5 years (Ltsg), changes of property, plant and equipment and other long-term assets in the previous year (∆PPE and ∆OLA), earnings surprise for the most recent quarter (UE), stock return for the past 12 months (Ret) and revision of analysts' two-year-out forecasts in the past 3 months (Rev). Detailed definition of variables is in Section 3. In each year, we first estimate the full model using data from the past five years. The dependent variable is the size-adjusted abnormal return for 13 months starting one month after the release of annual earnings. The independent variables are the same as those used in Table 2 . We then apply the estimated coefficients (insignificant coefficients are set to zero) to the current values of the prediction variables to predict the abnormal returns for the next 13 months. We form five quintile portfolios based on the predicted abnormal return. From Portfolio 1 to Portfolio 5, the predicted returns increase. In Panel A, we form quantile portfolios based on predicted abnormal returns as defined in Table 5 , and report the average forecast errors for each quintile. Error1 is the realized analyst forecast error for the upcoming annual earnings, and Error2 is the realized analyst forecast error for two-year-ahead annual earnings. In Panel B, we form quintile portfolios based on predicted analyst earnings forecasts for the upcoming fiscal year, and report the average future abnormal returns for each quintile. Fret4 and Fret13 are the size-adjusted abnormal returns for the 4 months and 13 months after portfolio formation respectively. In the last row of panel A (B), we report the coefficient estimates from pooled regressions of earnings forecast errors (abnormal returns) on the percentile ranks of predicted abnormal returns (predicted analyst forecast errors). 
TABLE 7 Analyst Forecasts as Noisy Proxies for Market Earnings Expectations
In each year, we first estimate the full model using data from the past five years, and then apply the estimated coefficients (insignificant coefficients are set to zero) to the current values of the prediction variables to predict the forecast errors and adjust the raw analyst forecasts. We then run contemporaneous annual return-earnings regressions, with the earnings expectations measured as a) the IBES consensus forecasts and b) the IBES consensus forecasts adjusted for the predicted errors. In each year, we first estimate the return prediction model using data from the past five years, and then apply the estimated coefficients (insignificant coefficients are set to zero) to the current values of the prediction variables to predict the abnormal returns for the next 13 months and adjust the realized abnormal returns accordingly. We then run contemporaneous annual reverse return-earnings regressions, with the actual abnormal returns or the adjusted abnormal return as the independent variables. 
Raw Forecast Errors Model-adjusted Forecast Errors
UE=
